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Abstract 
Research into the effects of focused attention on prime-to-behaviour effects indicates 
that heightened self-focus can eliminate stereotype and trait activation.  The present 
research investigated the influence of focused attention on prime-to-behaviour 
effects after the exposure to a threatening social group („hoodies‟). In particular it 
was predicted that focusing on an irrelevant target after „hoodie‟ priming would result 
in response preparation behaviour whereas self-focusing would inhibit it. Results 
revealed that self-focusing does indeed inhibit response preparation behaviour 
during an interpersonal context but failed to show the opposite effect for non self-
focusing. This suggests that purely focusing attention away from prime related 
material is sufficient to produce inhibitory effects. 
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Ethical Statement 
 The current study was conducted in accordance to ethical guidelines set out 
by the BPS and the School of Psychology at the University of Plymouth.  
 Each participant was briefed about the nature and procedure of the study 
before agreeing to sign a consent form. It was made clear to participants that their 
data would be kept anonymous and confidential and that they could withdraw from 
the study at any point without losing their course credit for taking part. 
After completing the study participants were fully debriefed and any questions 
answered, contact information for the researchers and supervisor was provided in 
case of further questions. 
An ethical issue raised in this study was that participants were deceived, in 
that they were made to believe a confederate was an actual participant. This was 
done in order to measure unconscious behaviour which would have been impossible 
to obtain without deception. Ethical approval was given as the deception was unlikely 
to cause participants any harm. 
All data reported in this study was collected by the author (Alex Wyatt-Barton) 
in conjunction with Francesca Starling and Aileen (Grace) Darlow. 
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Introduction 
Our environment is cognitively demanding and due to the amount of information that 
we have to process second by second our thoughts and behaviours can be 
influenced without us realising it (Eimer, 1999).  Situational cues and accessible 
constructs such as traits and stereotypes can shape our thoughts and behaviours, 
and the degree to which we have control over this varies (Bargh, Chen & Burrows, 
1996). For nearly half a century, social psychology research has looked into the 
effects primes have on people‟s judgements and behaviours towards others and the 
self. Over recent years research has tended to focus on prime-to-behaviour effects in 
interpersonal contexts and has shown that behaviours can be moderated to 
increase, decrease and reverse in line with previously primed constructs (Wheeler, 
DeMaree & Petty, 2007; Smeesters, Wheeler & Petty, 2009; Wyer et al., 2010). The 
self-concept has been shown to play an integral role in prime to-behaviour effects as 
environmental influences such as primes can induce alterations in the content of the 
active self-concept which then directs behaviour (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Wheeler et 
al., 2007; Smeesters, Yzerbyt, Corneille & Warlop, 2009). Due to the important role 
the self-concept has in guiding behaviour, recent research has investigated 
moderating the salience of the self versus non-self targets as a key feature in 
determining behaviour ensuing exposure to a prime (Dijksterhuis & van Kippenberg, 
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2000; DeMarree & Loersch, 2009; Macrae, Bodenhausen & Milne, 1998). The 
current research intends to look at the role self-focusing plays on prime-to-behaviour 
effects in an interpersonal context. 
Research provides evidence for at least three different types of prime-to-
behaviour effects; assimilation, contrast and response preparation (Bargh et al., 
1996; Dijksterhuis et al., 1998; Cesario, Plaks & Higgins, 2006). Most research in the 
area of prime-to-behaviour effects has concentrated on assimilation, whereby an 
individual primed with a trait concept or stereotype is more likely to behave in a 
prime consistent way. Across three experiments Bargh et al. (1996) found evidence 
to support this, for example one experiment found that participants primed with the 
stereotype „elderly‟ walked more slowly down a hallway than controls.  The rationale 
behind assimilation comes from the ideomotor account which suggests that 
behaviour following a primed concept is a direct and unmediated outcome from the 
links individuals have between the concept‟s representations and associated 
behavioural representations (Wheeler et al., 2007). For example exposure to the trait 
concept of rudeness is sufficient to initiate consistent behavioural representations 
like interrupting (Bargh et al., 1996). 
A second prime-to-behaviour effect emerged after Dijksterhuis et al. (1998) 
discovered that when individuals were primed with a concrete exemplar rather than 
an abstract stereotype they exhibited behavioural contrast instead of assimilation. 
Evidence indicates that the reason for this is that priming with exemplars can elicit 
judgmental contrasts through the inducement of social comparisons (Dijksterhuis et 
al. 1998). For example participants primed with the stereotype „professors‟ 
outperformed participants primed with the exemplar „Albert Einstein‟ on a general 
knowledge test (Dijksterhuis et al., 1998). Dijksterhuis et al. (1998) suggest that 
activating the exemplar „Albert Einstein‟ encourages a comparison with the self 
leading to a conception of the self as less intelligent. 
Arts and Dijksterhuis (2002) propose that the emergence of either assimilation or 
contrast behaviour following a prime is conditional on the degree to which the prime 
and target categories are believed to be comparable or not. Supporting evidence 
from Wheeler et al. (2007) implies that the extent to which the active self-concept 
assimilates or contrasts from a primed concept depends on whether the prime is 
similar or dissimilar from the self. Further evidence suggests that concepts that are 
dissimilar to the self but comparable heighten contrast in the active self-concept 
which then leads to contrast behaviour, while concepts that are similar but not 
comparable to the self heighten assimilation in the active self-account which then 
leads to assimilation behaviour (Arts and Dijksterhuis, 2002; Herr, 1986; Srull & 
Wyer, 1980; Stapel & Tesser, 2001; Wheeler et al., 2007). 
The most recent prime-to-behaviour effect to emerge is response preparation, 
whereby priming a social group may generate behaviour associated with interacting 
with the group (Cesario et al., 2006; Jonas & Sassenberg, 2006; Smeesters, 
Wheeler & Kay, 2009; Wyer et al., 2010). Cesario et al. (2006) discovered that when 
participants were primed with the social target „gay men‟ they showed evidence of 
preparing to interact (aggression) with the group rather than assimilation (femininity) 
or contrast effects (masculinity). Cersario et al. (2006) noted that personal attitudes 
and interaction goals played a crucial part in what kind of behaviour can result from a 
prime. For example if a person has a negative attitude towards the social group „gay 
men‟ then their behaviour following this prime would  be expected to be avoidant 
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and/or hostile, whilst behaviour of those with a positive attitude would be expected to 
be forthcoming. 
Jonas and Sassenberg (2006) support the findings of Cesario et al. (2006) but 
suggest that priming a social target can initiate related situation models that contain 
standard interaction sequences, therefore when encountering a social target the 
situation model activates associated response behaviours. Further research into 
prime-to-behaviour effects conducted by Smeesters et al. (2009a) indicates that 
when individuals focus on a non-self target prior exposure to a primed trait their 
behaviour in an interpersonal interaction is associated with assigning the primed trait 
to the other individual rather than assimilate the trait to their self. Wyer et al. (2010) 
provides recent evidence to support the previous findings. Wyer et al. (2010) found 
that participants primed with the social group „hoodies‟ prior to an interpersonal 
encounter resulted in behaviour consistent with interacting with a „hoodie‟ rather than 
assimilation or contrast to the group. Wyer et al. (2010) also found that emotions 
associated with interacting with the social group were also induced highlighting the 
complexity of prime-to-behaviour effects.  
Over recent years researchers have looked into whether certain prime-to-
behaviour effects should be expected over others however no clear conclusion has 
yet been reached (Arts & Dijksterhuis, 2002; DeMarree & Loersch, 2009; Smeesters 
et al., 2009; Wheeler et al., 2007; Wyer et al., 2010). Smeesters et al. (2009a) 
observed that even though the majority of social psychology research looks at the 
relationship between interpersonal processes and social behaviour, most research 
conducted in the area of prime-to-behaviour effects focuses on intrapersonal 
contexts. Wyer et al. (2010) noted that a key factor in establishing the nature of 
prime-to-behaviour effects is the nature of the behaviour being measured. Therefore 
a reason why earlier research into prime-to-behaviour effects result in either 
assimilation or contrast effects could be due to the fact they focus mainly on 
intrapersonal interactions rather than interpersonal.  
Where studies have utilized interpersonal interactions, the resulting behaviour is 
either defined by the ideomotor account or by a biased perception mechanism 
(Bargh et al, 1996; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980). The biased perception mechanism 
proposes that primes can influence an individual‟s perception of another person 
(Wheeler &Petty, 2001). For example Srull and Wyer (1979, 1980) found that 
participants primed with the trait concept „hostile‟ consequently judged a target 
person (Donald) as more unfriendly, while those primed with „kindness‟ judged 
Donald as more friendly. However Herr (1986) also found that participants primed 
with an extreme exemplar of hostility „Mike Tyson‟ judged the target person (Donald) 
as more friendly while participants primed with an extreme exemplar of friendliness 
„Peter Pan‟ judged Donald as more hostile. More recent supporting evidence for the 
biased perception mechanism found that participants primed with the trait concept 
„unkind‟ regarded their interaction partner as less kind (Smeesters et al., 2009a). 
Therefore when a primed concept like a trait or stereotype is activated, an individual 
may show signs of behavioural change because the concept activation steers them 
to perceive or interpret others or the situation in another way (Wheeler & Petty, 
2001). 
 Kay and colleagues (e.g. Kay et al., 2004; Kay, Wheeler & Smeesters, 2008) 
looked at the relationship between priming and perception by moderating the 
situational context. Kay et al. (2004) found that participants whose environment was 
set up with business related objects perceived a socially interactive game as less 
cooperative than participants exposed to neutral objects. Wyer et al. (2010) also 
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found that the situational construal can be influenced by primed concepts when they 
discovered that participants primed with the stereotype „hoodie‟ displayed more 
interference when they were exposed to threatening words than participants who 
were exposed to a neutral prime. Research therefore indicates that priming can 
influence interpersonal interactions by biasing the perception of the self, others and 
the construction of the social environment (Wyer et al., 2010). Consequently Bargh 
et al.‟s (1996) findings of the stereotype „elderly‟ influencing participants to walk more 
slowly than controls could be construed as the concept of „elderly‟ actually influenced 
participants to interpret the situation as more leisurely (related to retiring) rather than 
elderly people are slow (Wheeler & Petty, 2001).  
Wyer et al. (2010) investigated a number of outcomes in order to distinguish 
between the three prime-to-behaviour effects in interpersonal contexts. Wyer et al. 
(2010) found that participants expressed avoidance behaviour and feelings of 
discomfort when interacting with a stranger when primed with the stereotype „hoodie‟ 
which is consistent with response preparation put forward by Ceasario et al. (2006). 
However affective measures associated with characteristics of the prime itself 
illustrated that exposure to the „hoodie‟ prime did elicit assimilative effects. 
Interestingly Wyer et al. (2010) found that the affective measures (e.g. interference 
on a threat word Stroop task and self-reported hostility) indicated a tendency to be 
negatively correlated with avoidance behaviour. Wyer et al. (2010) suggest that 
reasons for this could be dependent upon the degree to which the induced affective 
state is ascribed to the self or situation, proposing it less likely to bias the perception 
of others if perceptions of the self or situation have already been biased.  
In order to disambiguate prime-to-behaviour effects Smeesters et al. (2009a) 
proposed that by moderating participants‟ focus on another person, biased social 
perceptions could mediate prime-to-behaviour effects. Smeester et al.‟s (2009a) key 
factor in determining whether primes can affect perceptions of others and whether 
those perceptions could in turn guide behaviour is the focused attention towards 
another individual. Smeesters et al. (2009a) predicted that if an individual is „other-
focused‟, their behaviour in an interpersonal context would be dependent on their 
perception of the other person in the interaction. Smeesters et al.‟s (2009a) findings 
were consistent with their prediction, participants in the „high other-focus‟ condition 
(e.g. use of third person pronouns he, she, it etc…) perceived their interaction 
partner as less kind when primed with the trait concept „unkind‟ than participants in 
the „low other-focus‟ condition. Wyer et al. (2010) provides scope for further research 
into measures of potential biases (like the self, others and situation) in interpersonal 
interactions through the manipulation of focused attention. The previous studies 
therefore indicate that focused attention could be a critical moderator and predictor 
of prime-to-behaviour effects. 
Following in line with previous research the current study investigated the 
mediation of biased social perceptions on prime-to-behaviour effects by moderating 
focused attention to the self in interpersonal contexts (Smeesters et al. 2009a; Wyer 
et al., 2010). Research indicates that self-focused attention through the use of a 
mirror can help to eliminate prime-to-behaviour effects (Dijksterhuis & van 
Kippenberg, 2000; Macrae, Bodenhausen & Milne, 1998). Across four studies 
Macrae et al. (1998) found that high self-focus induced participants produced less 
stereotypical descriptions of social targets than low self-focus participants, indicating 
that self-focused attention can lead to stereotype suppression. Macrae et al. (1998) 
suggested that self-focused attention only produces stereotype suppression in 
individuals who value stereotype avoidance. Dijksterhuis and van Kippenberg (2000) 
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investigated whether heightened self-focus would eliminate prime-to-behaviour 
effects. Their investigation uncovered that stereotype activation on behaviour 
completely disappeared in participants who were highly self-focused but remained in 
controls (Dijksterhuis & van Kippenberg, 2000). Interestingly, Dijksterhuis and van 
Kippenberg (2000) provide evidence to refute Macrae et al.‟s (1998) finding that self-
focused attention only produced suppression effects in individuals who value 
stereotype avoidance, in that self-focusing lead to an obstruction of undesirable 
behaviour in addition to an obstruction in desirable behaviour. The previous research 
supports the notion that self-focusing can override prime-to-behaviour effects 
irrespective of desirability (Dijksterhuis & van Kippenberg, 2000). 
Dijksterhuis and van Kippenberg (2000) proposed the reasoning for their findings 
is twofold. The first being that self-focusing brings about saliencies in alternative 
behavioural cues (Carver & Scheier, 1981, as cited in Dijksterhuis & van Kippenberg, 
2000). With the second being that dominant behavioural cues will actively inhibit 
activation of competing cues (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Powers, 1973, both as cited 
in Dijksterhuis & van Kippenberg, 2000). Indicating that the reason why prime-to-
behaviour effects result in normal conditions (low self-focus) is due to the fact that 
the activated stereotype is the only relevant behavioural cue available to guide 
behaviour, whilst in heightened self-focus conditions alternative cues are made 
salient which then dominate thoughts and guide behaviour instead of the prime 
(Dijksterhuis & van Kippenberg, 2000). 
More recent research discovered that self-focusing can lead to a change in 
perceptions and that subsequent behaviour generally follows (DeMarree & Loersch, 
2009). DeMarree and Loersch (2009) investigated whether the perceptions of the 
self or another target would be biased by a prime following focused attention. 
Results revealed that self-focused participants exposed to either an aggressive or 
neutral prime assimilated themselves to the prime through self ratings and behaviour 
during a Prisoner‟s Dilemma game (DeMarree & Loersch, 2009). DeMarree & 
Loersch (2009) discovered that when participants focused their attention to their best 
friend after exposure to an aggressive prime, ratings of the best friend were found to 
be more aggressive than if they‟d focused on themselves. These findings follow in 
line with Smeesters et al. (2009a) in that focused attention to a target after exposure 
to a primed concept can affect perceptions of that target. 
In light of the reviewed research the current study examined the effects of 
moderating focused attention on behaviour following a primed stereotype. Focused 
attention research indicates that self-focusing can inhibit prime consistent 
behaviours; hence the present study manipulates attention to focus on the self or an 
irrelevant target (Dijksterhuis & van Kippenberg, 2000; Macrae et al., 1998). 
Examination of prime-to-behaviour effects in interpersonal contexts suggest that the 
most likely behaviour to emerge is response preparation (Smeesters et al., 2009a; 
Wyer et al., 2010) Most research into interpersonal contexts don‟t actually employ a 
real person in the interaction, for example Wyer et al. (2010) and Smeesters et al. 
(2009a) simply imply that another person exists. Therefore the current study 
investigated prime-to-behaviour effects under an interpersonal context through the 
use of a confederate. Using the same „hoodie‟ stereotype prime as Wyer et al. 
(2010) the current study aimed to replicate the findings of Dijksterhuis and van 
Kippenberg (2000) and predicted that self-focusing would inhibit response 
preparation. It was also predicted that non self-focusing after the exposure to the 
primed stereotype of a „hoodie‟ would give way to response preparation (avoidance 
behaviour) during the interpersonal encounter (Wyer et al., 2010). The present study 
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also examined whether mood would be different across conditions, predicting that 
non self-focusing would encourage a response preparation affective state. A final 
hypothesis was that extraversion scores would alter across conditions, in particular it 
was predicted that extraversion scores would be lowest for the prime vs. non self-
focus condition. 
Method 
Participants 
 Seventy-two (9 male and 63 female) psychology undergraduates from the 
University of Plymouth volunteered to participate in the study to gain a course credit.  
Materials 
On arrival participants were given a printed handout briefing them about the 
experiment. The study used a computer based programme disguised as a spatial 
awareness task which aimed to implicitly prime the participants. Instructions were 
given on screen. Instructions for the target of thought task were issued on screen 
after the completion of the spatial awareness task; participants recorded their 
answers on a blank piece of paper then filed them in an envelope. The Differential 
Emotions Scale (DES) (Izard et al., 1971) was used to determine the participant‟s 
mood and the extroversion scale taken from the Big Five Personality Test 
(http://ipip.ori.org/) was used to measure the introversion/extroversion aspect of 
personality. A 5 metre tape measure was used to determine the distance between 
the confederate‟s chair and the participant‟s chair. All participants were fully 
debriefed. 
Design and Procedure 
 A between subjects design was used in which participants took part in a 
three-phase-experiment. Participants were tested individually and randomly 
assigned to the conditions of a Prime (neutral vs. hoodie) x Target of Thought (self 
vs. non-self).  
 The first phase of the experiment took place in a computer room whereby 
participants were asked to complete a computer based task, which was introduced 
as a „spatial awareness task‟. This was actually an implicit priming task adapted from 
Cesario, et al. (2006) which was designed to subliminally prime participants while 
they determined whether there was an odd or even number of circles displayed on 
the screen. The programme consisted of 100 trials. Each trial started with a string of 
10 asterisks (*) shown for 1,000ms followed by a priming stimulus (neutral or hoodie) 
for 11ms, two pattern masks – the first was a display of hash marks (#) in the same 
position as the priming stimulus and shown for 11ms, and the second contained 
circles of varying size and proportion on a grey background for 30ms. Finally the 
target picture (blue and purple circles on a grey background) was presented for 
2,000ms. Participants were asked to judge whether the number of coloured circles 
were odd or even by pressing the corresponding key on the keyboard.  
   Participants in the neutral prime condition were presented with a greyscale 
photograph of a young man in neutral attire and participants in the hoodie prime 
condition were presented with a greyscale photograph of a young man dressed in 
the style of a hoodie. These were the same primes used in Wyer et al.‟s (2010) 
study. 
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For the second phase of the experiment participants completed a writing task 
lasting for three minutes. Participants in the self-focus condition were asked to write 
about what makes them unique and those in the non self-focus condition were asked 
to write about a recent news event. This was the target of thought task and was 
designed to direct the participant‟s thoughts to a specific target, either themselves or 
away from themselves. As this task only intended to direct participants‟ thoughts, 
their responses were not needed for analysis so were disposed of appropriately.  
During the first and second phase of the experiment, two experimenters were 
present in the same room as the participant. At some point during the first two 
experimental phases, one of the experimenters left the room letting the other know 
that they are going to check on the „other participant‟. This was said loud enough for 
the participant to hear without distracting them. The „other participant‟ was in fact a 
confederate so it was important that the participants didn‟t suspect so. 
For the third phase of the experiment participants were shown to another 
room containing tables and chairs. Sat at one end of the table was the confederate, 
posing as „the other participant‟ by filling out questionnaires. It was therefore 
important to decrease suspicions about the confederate by previously making 
participants believe that the confederate was in fact a real participant. The room was 
set up so that the participant had complete control over where they sat. The 
experimenter issued the following instructions: 
“Please take a chair from the stack and go and sit at the table. 
I‟ll sort out your questionnaires and bring them over to you 
with a pen.” 
This then gave the experimenter time to organise the marker used to measure how 
far away from the confederate participants chose to sit. After the participant sat down 
the experimenter approached them, and crouched down next to their chair and gave 
them the DES (Izard et al., 1971) and the extroversion scale (http://ipip.ori.org/) 
delivering the following instructions: 
“Please fill in both questionnaires as honestly as possible. If 
you have any questions please don‟t hesitate to ask and just let 
me know when you‟ve finished.”  
Whilst issuing these instructions the experimenter covertly placed the marker on the 
floor on the inside back chair leg closest to the confederate. When the participants 
had finished the questionnaires they were fully debriefed and any questions 
answered. The distance between the marker and the confederate‟s chair was then 
measured and recorded. 
Results 
 Debriefing revealed that one participant knew about the confederate as they 
were informed by a friend prior to the study, and that one participant actually saw the 
hoodie prime during the spatial awareness task. The latter participant‟s data did not 
affect the overall results so were included in analysis but the former participant‟s 
data was withdrawn and excluded from further analysis, therefore leaving a final 
sample of seventy-one participants. A significant result for gender was obtained 
Prime F(1, 41) = 5.84, p<.05 however due to the unequal sample the effect was not 
investigated further. 
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Descriptive statistics for the distance participants choose to sit away from the 
confederate in all four conditions are given in Table 1. 
Table1 Means and standard deviations for the distance (in centimetres) participants chose 
to sit away from the confederate in all four conditions (hoodie self-focus n = 19; hoodie non 
self-focus n= 16; neutral self-focus n= 18; neutral non self-focus n=18). 
 
 Table 1 indicates that the effect of focused attention after being subjected to a 
prime on avoidance behaviour (distance) was in the direction predicted. Table 1 
shows that the distances participants chose to sit away from the confederate were 
very similar in both the Neutral and Hoodie conditions for the Self-Focus conditions. 
However, only small differences can be seen between the Non Self-Focus 
conditions.  
          Mean distance between the participant and confederate are given in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Means for the distance (in centimetres) participants choose to sit away from the 
confederate in all four conditions. 
Condition Mean Distance (cm) Standard Deviation (cm) 
Hoodie Prime 
                   Self-Focus 
              Non Self-Focus 
                      Total 
                                   
83.10                               
89.50 
86.03 
 
15.29 
12.63 
14.30 
Neutral Prime 
                   Self-Focus 
              Non Self-Focus 
                      Total 
 
85.72 
87.55 
86.64 
 
18.40 
16.79 
17.38 
Total 
                   Self-Focus 
              Non Self-Focus 
                      Total 
 
84.38 
88.47 
86.34 
 
16.69 
14.79 
15.83 
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Figure 1 shows that on average participants in the Hoodie Non Self-Focus 
condition sat further away from the confederate than participants from all other 
conditions. Figure 1 also shows that on average participants in the Hoodie Self-
Focus condition sat closer to the confederate than participants in all other conditions. 
Figure 1 also indicates that participants who were self-focused sat closer to the 
confederate than participants who were non self-focused. 
Scores for the behavioural measure of avoidance were submitted to a Prime 
(neutral vs. hoodie) x Target of Thought (self-focus vs. non self-focus) ANOVA. The 
two way between subjects ANOVA revealed no significant difference for the main 
effect for Prime F(1, 67) = .01, p>.50 or for Target of Thought F(1, 67) = 1.17, p>.15 
and showed no significant interaction between Prime x Target of Thought , F(1, 67) 
=.36, p>.50. 
The reliability of the DES III and the extroversion scale from The Big Five 
Personality Test were analysed using Cronbach‟s Alpha. Cronbach‟s Alpha for the 
DES III =.87, and Cronbach‟s Alpha for the extroversion scale =.88. Therefore both 
questionnaires show good internal consistency and were reliable measures. 
The critical moods that were measured using the DES III were, Joy, Distress, 
Anger, Shyness and Fear. Descriptive statistics for participants‟ moods in all four 
conditions are given in Table 2. 
Table 2 Means and standard deviations of participant’s moods in all four conditions. The 
highest score for each mood=5 and the lowest score for each mood =1. 
Mood                                  Condition         Mean   Standard         Deviation 
Joy                           
                                Hoodie Self-Focus 
                          Hoodie Non Self-Focus 
                                Neutral Self-Focus 
                          Neutral Non Self-Focus 
        
        3.40 
        3.42 
        3.57 
        3.39 
      
      .80 
     .74 
     1.01 
       .94 
Distress                  
                                 Hoodie Self-Focus 
                          Hoodie Non Self-Focus 
                                Neutral Self-Focus 
                          Neutral Non Self-Focus 
         
        2.25 
        2.52 
        2.24 
        2.18 
      
      .47 
      .93 
     .85 
     .71 
Anger                      
                                 Hoodie Self-Focus 
                          Hoodie Non Self-Focus 
                                Neutral Self-Focus 
                          Neutral Non Self-Focus 
         
        2.17 
        2.39 
        2.05 
        2.15 
      
     .90 
     .83 
     .72 
     .83 
Shyness                  
                                 Hoodie Self-Focus 
                          Hoodie Non Self-Focus 
                                Neutral Self-Focus 
                          Neutral Non Self-Focus 
         
        2.12 
        2.62 
        1.91 
        1.93 
      
     .60 
     .99 
     .77 
     .70 
Fear                         
                                 Hoodie Self-Focus 
                          Hoodie Non Self-Focus 
                                Neutral Self-Focus 
                          Neutral Non Self-Focus 
         
        1.73 
        2.08 
        1.72 
        1.72 
      
     .59 
     1.11 
     .96 
     .71 
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 Table 2 indicates that the effect of focused attention after being subjected to a 
prime on mood was in the direction predicted. Table 2 shows that for each mood 
there is not much variation across the four conditions. However, mean scores for 
Distress, Anger, Shyness and Fear are seen to be at their highest for participants in 
the Hoodie Non Self-Focus condition. 
 Scores for the affective measure of mood were submitted to a Prime (neutral 
vs. hoodie) x Target of Thought (self-focus vs. non self-focus) ANOVA. Five two way 
between subjects ANOVAs were carried out, one for each mood. The only significant 
difference on mood to emerge was the main effect for Prime on Shyness F(1,67) = 
6.27, p= 0.15. No significant difference was found for the main effect of Target of 
Thought on Shyness F(1,67) = 2.03, p>.15 or for the for the interaction between 
Prime x Target of Thought , F(1, 67) =1.74, p>.15.  No other significant differences 
were found for mood.  
Descriptive statistics for participants‟ extroversion levels in all four conditions 
are given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Means and standard deviations of participant’s extroversion levels across all four 
conditions. Higher scores indicate higher levels of extroversion. 
                                           Condition         Mean Standard     
Deviation 
Extroversion  
                                Hoodie Self-Focus 
                          Hoodie Non Self-Focus 
                                Neutral Self-Focus 
                         Neutral Non Self-Focus 
 
        67.00 
        62.87 
        66.17 
        66.55 
      
     13.19 
     12.04 
     11.28 
     10.03 
 
 Table 3 indicates that the effect of focused attention after being subjected to a 
prime on extroversion was in the direction predicted. Table 3 reveals that there are 
not any considerable differences in extroversion between the four conditions. 
However Table 3 also shows that participants in the Hoodie Self-Focus condition 
were the most extroverted group and participants in the Hoodie Non Self-Focus 
condition were the least extroverted group. Table 3 also shows not much of a 
difference between both the Neutral conditions but a slightly larger difference 
between the Hoodie conditions. 
 Scores for the trait measure of extroversion were submitted to a Prime 
(hoodie vs. control) x Target of Thought (self-focus vs. non self-focus) ANOVA. The 
two way between subjects ANOVA revealed no significant difference for the main 
effect for Prime F(1, 67) = .26, p>.50 or for Target of Thought F(1, 67) = .45, p>.50 
and showed no significant interaction between Prime x Target of Thought , F(1, 67) 
=.66, p>.15. 
Discussion 
 The effect of focused attention on prime-to-behaviour effects was both 
consistent and inconsistent with the hypothesis made. One hypothesis made was 
that self-focusing after exposure to the „hoodie‟ prime would inhibit its activation 
therefore eliminating response preparation effects. This hypothesis was confirmed as 
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no difference in seating distance was found between the „neutral‟ or „hoodie‟ primes, 
thus supporting previous research into the influence of self-focusing on prime-to-
behaviour effects (Dijksterhuis & van Kippenberg, 2000; Macrae et al., 1998). The 
hypothesis that predicted non-self focusing after exposure to the „hoodie‟ prime 
would give way to response preparation effects was found to be in the direction 
predicted but failed to reach statistical significance. No difference in seating distance 
or mood was found between the „neutral‟ or „hoodie‟ primes. This finding does not 
support previous research into prime to behaviour effects (Cesario et al., 2006; 
DeMarree & Loersch, 2009; Dijksterhuis & van Kippenberg, 2000; Macrae et al., 
1998; Smeesters et al., 2009; Wyer et al., 2010). Another hypothesis predicted that 
there would be a difference in mood across conditions. Even though results were in 
the direction predicted in that participants primed with a „hoodie‟ rated higher for 
negative moods and lower for positive moods than „neutral‟ primed participants, the 
only mood to produce a significant result was shyness. Suggesting that the „hoodie‟ 
prime made participants feel less confident and more timid than participants in the 
„neutral‟ prime condition, indicating self-focusing did not completely inhibit response 
preparation effects. Another hypothesis was that there would be a difference in 
extroversion scores across conditions; however this also failed to reach statistical 
significance but did reveal that on average participants in the „hoodie‟ vs. non self-
focus condition averaged the lowest scores. 
Previous research highlights the direct and powerful influence of prime-to-
behaviour effects (Wheeler et al., 2007). Activation of stereotypes and traits through 
priming demonstrates that behaviour can be influenced without conscious 
awareness and has shown to improve performance on general knowledge tests, 
make individuals act aggressively, and walk slowly (Dijksterhuis et al., 1998; 
DeMarree & Loersch, 2009; Bargh et al., 1996). However further research indicates 
that self-focused attention can inhibit these effects (Dijksterhuis & van Kippenberg, 
2000; Macrae et al., 1998). The current study found that self-focusing does indeed 
inhibit previously found prime-to-behaviour effects supporting previous findings by 
Dijksterhuis and van Kippenberg, (2000) and Macrae et al. (1998). Importantly 
however, the present research is believed to be the only study to date to establish 
that self-focusing inhibits prime-to-behaviour effects in an interpersonal context.  
Self-focusing is believed to inhibit prime-to-behaviour effects due to an 
activation of multiple alternative cues which may dominate consciousness overruling 
unconscious cues to guide behaviour (Dijksterhuis & van Kippenberg, 2000). Due to 
the vast amount of individual differences in conscious cue activations, results would 
likely produce the null effects obtained in the present research. 
Recent research by Corcoan, Hundhammer and Mussweiler (2009) into 
reducing stereotypes by comparative thinking found that stereotype activation is 
inhibited when comparative thinking is employed. Participants who focused on 
similarities between two pictures displayed prime-to-behaviour effects whilst those 
who focused on differences did not (Corcoran et al., 2009). The present study 
utilized such thinking in that participants in the self-focus condition were asked to 
write a description about what makes them unique thus enhancing comparative 
thought proposing another alternative as to why and how self-focusing inhibits prime-
to-behaviour effects.  
DeMarree and Loersch (2009) recently found that self-focusing did not inhibit 
prime-to-behaviour effects but alternatively gave way to assimilation. DeMarree and 
Loersch (2009) proposed that self-focusing causes a disambiguation of the prime as 
the self which encourages a change in the active self-concept towards a biased self 
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perception. It is important to note that the present study does not refute DeMarree & 
Loersch‟s (2009) findings, as prime (hoodie) consistent behaviour was not measured 
in the current research. 
Wyer et al. (2010) illustrate the importance of the nature of the behaviour 
under scrutiny on determining the nature of prime-to-behaviour effects. Smeesters et 
al. (2009) found that focusing on the third person leads to a prime biased perception 
of another person in an interpersonal context, resulting in response preparation 
behaviour. DeMarree and Loersch (2009) also uncovered assimilative effects for 
aggression ratings of a best friend only when focused attention was directed to the 
best friend (DeMarree & Loersch, 2009). Wyer et al. (2010) also uncovered 
assimilation effects, participants‟ self-report of traits associated with hoodies (e.g. 
hostility and irritation) was higher after the subliminal „hoodie‟ prime than the „neutral‟ 
prime. Smeesters et al. (2009) suggest that perceptions can mediate prime-to-
behaviour effects, considering the current study used a similar priming programme to 
Wyer et al. (2010) and self-focus task to DeMarree and Loersch (2009) assimilation 
effects could have occurred during the present study, however this was not tested. 
This provides researchers with a future avenue of research, in that self-directed 
perceptions could be effected through self-focusing (DeMarree & Loersch, 2009). 
Previous research indicates that low or no self focusing can result in prime-to-
behaviour effects; however the present study found evidence to suggest otherwise 
(Dijksterhuis & van Kippenberg, 2000; Macrae et al., 1998; Wyer et al., 2010). The 
present study found that focusing on a recent news event was as effective at 
inhibiting prime-to-behaviour effects as self-focusing. Smeesters et al. (2009) found 
that participants who were highly focused on „another‟ prior to a prime altered their 
perception of the other person in an interpersonal context in accordance to response 
preparation behaviour. While behaviour of participants who were low other focused 
was no different for each prime suggesting that low other focus inhibited response 
preparation behaviour. 
Apart from focused attention and the use of a confederate, the current study 
followed the same procedure as Wyer et al. (2010). The inhibitory effects gained for 
non self-focused participants suggests that either the non self-focus target itself, the 
use of the confederate or a combination of both are responsible for the non 
significant results gained.  
Wyer et al. (2010) found that affective measures were negatively correlated 
with response preparation behaviour suggesting that once an affective state is 
attributed to the self or situation, a biased perception of another individual in an 
interpersonal context is unlikely to occur. As the current study asked participants to 
focus on a recent news event the likelihood of the information being emotionally 
arousing is high (Uribe & Gunter, 2007), therefore an effective state may have been 
attributed to the situation due to the focus of the news event leading to the likelihood 
that the perceptions of the confederate were uninfluenced by the prime, resulting in 
an inhibition of response preparation behaviour.  
Research into the effect of emotional and stereotypic thinking on social 
judgment produces varying evidence (Bodenhausen, Kramer & Susser, 1994a; 
Bodenhausen, Sheppard & Kramer, 1994b; Ric, 2004).  Bodenhausen and 
colleagues (e.g. Bodenhausen et al.1994a,1994b) found that happiness increases a 
reliance on stereotypes whilst sadness decreases it. However Ric (2004) found 
opposite effects, sadness increases a reliance on stereotypes and happiness 
decreases it. As the present study asked participants to focus on a recent news 
event, the event they focused on could have aroused happiness or sadness 
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depending on the subject matter. This may have caused participants to attribute an 
affective sate to the situation, causing the inhibition of a biased perception of the 
confederate (Kay et al., 2004,2008; Wyer et al.,2010). However, as the responses to 
the target of thought task were not reviewed and disposed of, the present study 
offers no insight as to whether emotions were guiding behaviour rather than the 
prime. In future it would be important to look into the responses that individuals give 
during a descriptive focus task to determine whether their actual target of focus is in 
line with the instructions and if the way individuals‟ focus influences behaviour. 
Arts and Dijksterhuis (2002) investigated the effects of extreme exemplars on 
behaviour and found that they can result in comparison standards which lead 
participants to contrast a target person with the prime. Herr (1986) found that 
participants primed with an extreme exemplar of hostility or kindness produced 
contrast effects on social target judgments. As the type of prime used in the present 
study was a picture of a hoodie, this may have been perceived as an extreme 
exemplar opposed to priming with words associated with the „hoodie‟ group. The 
social group of „hoodies‟ are seen as antisocial and intimidating so when the 
participant met the confederate in the other room they may have unconsciously 
contrasted them away from the hoodie and sat closer to them than they would of 
done if they were engaging in a response preparation manner. 
In most interpersonal context studies the other person is not necessarily real, 
for example Srull and Wyer (1979, 1980) only use an imagined target called Donald, 
while Smeesters et al. (2009a), Wyer et al. (2010) and Corcoran et al. (2009) don‟t 
actually use another person they simply imply that one exists. As the present study 
actually employed a confederate, an actual interpersonal context was enabled to be 
accessed and examined. Stapel and Koomen (1997) proposed that extreme 
exemplars provide a comparison relevant for a social target to be judged against. 
Stapel and Koomen (1997) suggest that if a primed exemplar and the social target 
are believed to be comparable the more likely an individual is to contrast perceptions 
of the prime away from the social target. In the present study the confederate and 
hoodie may have been perceived as comparable in that they are both young adults 
which may have led participants to contrast the confederate away from the prime 
and perceived them as less hoodie like. This indicates that during the actual 
interpersonal encounter response preparation behaviour may have been cancelled 
out.  
 Smeesters et al. (2009b) suggest that individual differences in self-concept 
accessibility can determine an individual‟s susceptibility to prime-to-behaviour 
effects. Smeesters et al. (2009b) found that participants with a high accessible self-
concept were less susceptible to prime-to-behaviour effects than low accessible self-
concept participants. As self-concept accessibility was not measured in the current 
study the possibility that participants in the non self-focused condition had highly 
accessible self-concepts making them less vulnerable to the prime‟s influence 
cannot be overlooked. 
Ruys et al. (2007) found that when an interpersonal context is activated, 
automatic comparison to the social self can moderate evaluations made to the social 
target. Ruys et al. (2007) found that salient categories such as gender and ethnicity 
can induce a comparison to the self. Therefore if the social target is similar to the 
participant they are unlikely to behave in accordance to the previously primed 
stereotype. In reference to the present study, the majority of the participants were 
white, young females and the confederate was always a white, young and female. 
As the confederate could have potentially been assimilated to the participant, the 
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likelihood that the primed stereotype was used to guide behaviour would have been 
reduced, resulting in response behaviour effects being suppressed. 
The present research reaches the conclusions that self-focusing after the 
exposure of a primed stereotype does inhibit prime-to-behaviour effects, supporting 
previous research (Dijkstrehuis & van Kippenberg, 2000; Macrae et al., 1998). 
Although most results were found to show no significant difference in behaviour for 
each prime, a significant result for shyness revealed that self-focusing does not 
completely eliminate prime-to-behaviour effects and suggest that rebound effects 
may occur due to the stereotype suppression (Macrea et al., 1998). The current 
study also indicates that focusing in general inhibits prime-to-behaviour effects as 
focusing on an irrelevant target also revealed no difference in avoidance behaviour 
across primes. This finding was not predicted and does not support previous 
research (Dijksterhuis & van Kippenberg, 2000; Macrea et al., 1998); however it is to 
be believed that the present research is the only study that currently looks into 
focused attention on prime-to-behaviour effects in an actual interpersonal context.  
As non self-focusing led to an inhibition of prime-to-behaviour effects further 
research should be carried out to establish what type of focused attention inhibits 
and what enhances prime-to-behaviour effects. Further research should also look 
into whether self-focusing can actually enhance assimilation effects as proposed by 
DeMarree and Loersch (2009) in interpersonal contexts. As the current study‟s 
predictions were both consistent and inconsistent with previous research no solid 
conclusions can be made therefore generating interesting avenues for future 
research. 
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